Parshat Naso,Rabbi David Hertzberg

Space Shuttle Columbia nearly made it back. But on February 1, 2003 it disintegrated upon reentry into the earth's atmosphere. The accident was the result of damage the shuttle sustained from foam which hit it during takeoff. While it could be argued that nothing could have been done to ensure the shuttle's safe return, the greater tragedy is that little was attempted.

Upon examining photos of the damage, NASA engineer Rodney Rocha and some colleagues organized an informal group to study it. They felt they needed more visual data and sent a request up the ranks, through appropriate channels, to the Defense Department asking that one of the department's satellites be repositioned to take pictures of the damaged area. However, the shuttle management team refused to send on the request. The prevailing outlook was that foam accidents had become routine. Linda Ham, director of the Mission Management Team, explained that foam had hit the shuttle on almost every mission and it merely represented a delay in turnaround time for the next mission. Additionally, she commented that foam was "not really a factor during the flight because there is not much we can do about it" (Why Great Leaders Don't Take Yes for an Answer, by Michael Roberto, 2005, p.63).

At a meeting several days before the accident the foam issue was raised again. This time Rocha was in attendance. When the potential danger of the foam strike was downplayed Rocha, despite his strong feelings to the contrary, chose to remain silent. The Columbia investigation revealed that Rocha's silence reflected an even more serious problem infecting NASA than the decision of downplaying the dangers inherent in the foam strike and not approving additional satellite imagery. It reflected the presence of a cultural fungus. "The organization had operated according to hierarchical procedures and strict rules of protocol for as long as the shuttles had been flying. Communication often followed a strict chain of command, and engineers rarely interacted directly with senior managers who were several levels higher in the organization. Status differences had stifled dialogue for years" (p.65).

When examining a failure (or for that matter, a success) it is not sufficient to identify and study the immediate cause. To effectively learn from the event one must look further back and identify other variables, such as earlier decisions and cultural norms. Only through such painstakingly thorough investigations can accurate lessons be learned and help improve future decision-making. The Mayanei Shel Torah quotes an explanation to apasuk in this week's parsha that captures the power of this idea.

The Torah describes how a person who commits a sin involving theft and false swearing should repent (5:6). In thispasuk the singular word sin is used. However, in the next pasuk, which mandates confession on the part of the sinner, the Torah switches to the plural and describes how the person should confess his sins. The Mayanei Shel Torah answers this question with the following analogy: when a patient goes to the doctor, the doctor does not just examine the symptoms. He knows that in order to properly treat the patient he must identify the underlying cause of the ailment.

The same holds true with regard to repentance. When a person confesses his sin he doesn't merely state the obvious. Confession is not a formality. Rather, the person must examine all his previous actions and identify which ones set him on the path to this sin. Specifically with respect to the sin of stealing, it is well known that it doesn't happen in a vacuum. For example, jealousy leads to coveting, which leads to stealing which, as in the case under discussion, leads to swearing falsely. It is for this reason the Torah requires the person to confess hissins and not just his most recentsin. The person must repent for all the things that he did which led to this moment.

Leaders must always be aware of the potential consequences of even their most subtle actions. A sarcastic reaction to a comment by an advisor might discourage that person from speaking up in the future and deprive the leader of valuable information. Likewise, when something undesirable occurs the leader should be objective and examine what led to the crisis or failure. When something good happens the leader should also be objective in order to properly identify the ingredients that led to the success and thus replicate them. Although clocks cannot be turned back, they can be set more accurately for the future.

Rabbi Dr. David Hertzberg is the principal of the Yeshivah of Flatbush Middle Division. Comments can be emailed to him at mdrabbi@aol.com.

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